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Human Embryos, Patents, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of patenting human life is relatively new and there is no 
general agreement on whether laws prevent the patenting of human-
embryo inventions.  The United States Constitution grants Congress the 
power “To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”1  From this constitutional grant of 
authority, Congress established the Patent Act of 1790,2 creating a patent 
system for the purpose of promoting the innovation and 
commercialization of new technologies.3  Even more recently, Congress 
passed the 1952 Patent Act4 in an effort to strengthen the patent system.5  
Essentially, a patent gives its holder the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the patented invention.6  The right to exclude, 
however, should not be confused with the right to practice the invention.7  
In fact, a patent holder can only practice, i.e., make, use, or sell, the 
patented invention, if other patents do not exist regarding the same 
subject matter and if there is no federal or state regulation preventing the 
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 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790), repealed by Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 2 Stat. 318 
(1793). 
 3. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 121 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the history of the United States patent system). 
 4. 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000). 
 5. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 122. 
 6. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(A) (allowing patent holders to recover reasonable royalties when 
others make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention); see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 126 (noting that a “patent confers the right to exclude others”). 
 7. MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 126–27 (giving two reasons why a patent is not an 
affirmative right—one, the government may prohibit practicing the invention; two, there may be 
existing patents excluding the patent holder from practicing the invention). 
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practice of the patented activity.8  Currently, the range of patentable 
subject matter is very broad, but the idea of patenting living organisms is 
relatively new.9 
Nearly 140 years after the establishment of the patent system, 
Congress took its first affirmative step toward allowing patents for living 
organisms when it passed the 1930 Plant Patent Act.10  However, the 
Plant Patent Act was just the beginning for patents involving life as 
Congress further expanded the scope of patentable subject matter with 
the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970.11  In addition to congressional 
acceptance of patents involving life, the Supreme Court of the United 
States embraced the patentability of living organisms by upholding a 
patent for genetically engineered, oil-eating bacteria, stating that 
patentable subject matter includes “‘anything under the sun that is made 
by man.’”12  The Court’s holding, however, is qualified by a prior 
holding, which distinguished between discoveries and inventions.  In 
1948, the Court held unpatentable an unnatural combination of naturally 
occurring bacteria, finding the combination was a discovery and not an 
invention.13  Despite the distinction between discoveries and inventions, 
the first patent covering a mammal was issued in 1988,14 and today 
“patentable biotechnology includes genetically manipulated animals such 
as rats, pigs, sheep, and even genetically manipulated foods such as 
tomatoes, rice, and corn.”15 
Patents involving human life have created recent controversy, and 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) stance on the 
matter is not abundantly clear.  Although the USPTO has made 
                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (defining the modern legal standard 
for patentable subject matter). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2000).  This Act states that anyone who “invents or discovers and 
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, 
hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an 
uncultivated state, may obtain a patent.”  Id. § 161. 
 11. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321 et seq. (2000) (providing patent-like protection similar to the 
protection provided by the Plant Patent Act, but for sexually reproducing plant species). 
 12. See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 303, 309 (quoting congressional intent for patentable subject 
matter). 
 13. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“He who 
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes.”). 
 14. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (patenting a mouse genetically 
engineered to be particularly susceptible to cancer). 
 15. See Robert Greene Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject 
Matter Under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L. REV. 217, 224 (2004) (discussing the breadth of 
statutory subject matter for patents). 
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statements denying the patentability of human life, patents involving 
human embryos already exist.16  For example, in 2001 the USPTO issued 
a patent with claims covering a process of cloning mammals and the 
products produced by the process, i.e., the cloned mammals themselves, 
which implicates the human embryo because humans are mammals and 
embryos are used for cloning.17  Nevertheless, at least one commentator 
claims that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits human-embryo 
patents.18  For the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit human-embryo 
patents, the Amendment must apply to human embryos and preclude the 
type of relationship that exists between a patent holder and a patented 
human embryo. 
This Comment argues that the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply 
to human embryos, and even if it did, the relationship between patent 
holder and human embryo does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of freedom.  In order to provide sufficient context to resolve 
these two major issues, Part II provides background regarding the human 
embryo’s biological and legal significance in addition to a discussion of 
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  Part III.A argues that because 
slavery only indirectly affected unborn life and, given the current limited 
legal rights of the human embryo, the Thirteenth Amendment does not 
apply to human embryos.  Part III.B discusses how the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of “involuntary servitude,” as used in the Amendment, 
cannot possibly apply to the human embryo based upon the Court’s 
language.  Part III.C compares the property interest associated with a 
patent to the relationship between slaveholder and slave, and ultimately 
concludes that human-embryo patents are not “akin to African slavery.”  
Finally, Part III.D suggests several practical and policy justifications for 
not reading the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit human-embryo 
patents. 
                                                     
 16. John Miller, Note, A Call to Legal Arms: Bringing Embryonic Stem Cell Therapies to 
Market, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 555, 561–62 (2003).  In 1998, U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 was 
issued regarding a specific protocol for isolation of human embryonic stem cells, and in 2001, U.S. 
Patent No. 6,200,806 was issued over human stem cells “exclud[ing] others from making, using, 
selling, or importing human embryonic stem cells throughout the United States.”  Id. 
 17. See Justin Gillis, A New Call for Cloning Policy, WASH. POST, May 17, 2002, at A12; see 
also Esther Slater McDonald, Note, Patenting Human Life and the Rebirth of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1359, 1361–62 n.14 (2003) (stating that other patents 
regarding cloning specifically exclude human clones; however, this patent makes no such explicit 
exclusion). 
 18. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 1386–87 (concluding that the Thirteenth Amendment 
precludes human-embryo patents). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Patenting Human Life and the Rebirth of the Thirteenth Amendment 
Esther McDonald argues that the Thirteenth Amendment is a legal 
barrier that prevents inventors from patenting human-embryo 
technologies.19  Her argument is that the Framers intended the Thirteenth 
Amendment to apply to human embryos by implicitly adopting the 
public opinion of the time, which was that the embryo deserved the 
utmost respect of a human being.20  She further claims that the Thirteenth 
Amendment ended property ownership of human beings, and therefore 
inventors should not be able to patent human embryos because a human-
embryo patent would give the patent holder a property interest in a 
human being.21 
McDonald opines: “history provides no support . . . that the framers 
intended to define ‘human being’” in a way to exclude human embryos 
because “[n]o relevant sources—neither public commentary, 
congressional debates, nor federal jurisprudence—suggest that the 
framers determined to alter the definition of human being from its 
scientific meaning.”22  According to McDonald, near the time the 
Amendment was enacted, physicians and the general public agreed the 
scientific definition of “human-being” included “prenatal human 
beings.”23  She notes that one physician wrote a book declaring life’s 
beginnings upon formation of the embryonic stem cell, and another 
physician “instructed Harvard’s Medical College on the humanity of the 
embryo, describing the embryo as ‘a human being’ from ‘the moment an 
embryo enters the uterus a microscopic speck.’” 24  McDonald also relies 
upon abortion literature of the time by commenting that various 
                                                     
 19. Id.; see also Aaron Zitner, Patently Provoking a Debate, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2002, at A1 
(stating “the patent office argues that human embryos are equivalent to human beings, which puts 
them beyond the reach of patent claims” and “[a]lthough Congress has never spoken directly on the 
subject, the patent office says it infers the ban on these patents from such doctrines as the 13th 
Amendment ban of slavery”). 
 20. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 1376–81 (arguing that the Framers adopted the Thirteenth 
Amendment with the then-current understanding that the human embryo was a “human being”). 
 21. See id. at 1382–85 (arguing that a negative property right violates the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of “chattelism,” the idea of man owning man as property). 
 22. See id. at 1376 (highlighting that others who argue “that the Thirteenth Amendment does 
not apply to human embryos” do not base their argument on the premise “that embryos are not 
human beings”). 
 23. Id.; see also Zitner, supra note 19 (“[T]he patent office argues that human embryos are 
equivalent to human beings, which puts them beyond the reach of patent claims.”). 
 24. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 1377 (noting that another medical professor described the 
embryo as a human being independent from its mother). 
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physicians and professors criticized abortion as “destruction of a life.”25  
In addition, McDonald asserts that feminists viewed the destruction of 
prenatal humans as contrary to the human rights of the embryo.26  She 
notes that feminists distinguished the use of contraceptives from embryo 
destruction “because [contraception] merely prevent[s] the creation of a 
human being,” but once the embryo is conceived it should have every 
right to exist.27  Essentially, McDonald argues that it was the intent of the 
legislators to incorporate the human embryo within the scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment because the legislators did not alter the then-
existing scientific and public understanding of the human embryo as a 
human being.28 
McDonald argues further that the Declaration of Independence, 
Constitution, and political philosophy of the time demonstrate that the 
Thirteenth Amendment was intended to abolish property ownership of 
human beings.29  She explains that “[b]y 1865, ‘virtually everyone . . . 
understood slavery as chattelism,’ the idea that human beings can be 
property,”30 including the Supreme Court, which declared that the 
Thirteenth Amendment abolished chattelism and protected the individual 
freedom of human beings.31  Although not all congressmen agreed that 
the Amendment guaranteed civil liberties as well as individual freedom, 
even congressmen holding this narrow view agreed that the Amendment 
ended chattelism and the idea of treating human beings as property.32  
And this is exactly why McDonald emphasizes that “[a] patent bestows 
upon the patent holder a property right in the patented invention,” 
because the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
invention is essential to owning property and therefore violates the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of owning human beings as 
property.33  McDonald summarizes that “[a]t a minimum, the 
                                                     
 25. See id. at 1378–80 (quoting medical doctors and professors as agreeing upon the fact that a 
human embryo exists as a human being and noting other groups, such as feminists, recognize the 
embryo as human life).  To bolster her point, McDonald remarks that “[i]n 1859, the [American 
Medical Association (AMA)] issued a Report on Criminal Abortion” and “[t]he passage of 
legislation criminalizing abortion, particularly in response to the AMA’s campaign, demonstrates 
that in the 1800s the national public regarded the embryo as a human being.”  Id. 
 26. Id. at 1380–81. 
 27. Id. at 1380. 
 28. Id. at 1381. 
 29. Id. at 1371–74. 
 30. Id. at 1371–72 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 31. Id. at 1374–75. 
 32. Id. at 1374.  Congress responded to this possible narrow interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the civil liberties of all citizens.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 1384, 1386. 
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Amendment abolished chattelism, or property interest in a human 
being,”34 and human-embryo patents violate the Amendment by giving 
the patent holder a property interest in a human being.35 
A proper analysis of this issue, however, requires consideration of 
modern scientific and legal approaches for understanding the human 
embryo and a thorough search for defining exactly what the Thirteenth 
Amendment abolished.  McDonald’s argument oversimplifies both 
whether the Amendment even applies to human embryos and the type of 
property ownership prohibited by the Amendment.  This Comment 
argues that the human embryo does not warrant Thirteenth Amendment 
protection; however, even if the Thirteenth Amendment applies to human 
embryos, it still does not prevent the type of relationship created by a 
patent. 
B. The Human Embryo’s Biological and Legal Significance 
Rather than conclude that a human embryo is a human being 
deserving complete respect, science and the law respect only the 
potential of the human embryo to develop into a human individual.  A 
modern scientific approach focuses on whether the human embryo 
represents “life-in-general”36 or “life in a special sense.”37  Essentially, 
all life on earth is “life-in-general,” such as bacteria, plants, insects, and 
animals; however, as human beings, we distinguish ourselves as more 
“special” than other living organisms based upon the “ability to feel and 
express a range of genuine human emotions and, most important, [the] 
attainment of the uniquely human condition of reflective self-
awareness.”38  Despite this distinction, the slow and continuous nature of 
human development makes it difficult for scholars to pinpoint the exact 
moment in human development when an individual becomes “special.”39  
                                                     
 34. Id. at 1373. 
 35. Id. at 1386. 
 36. See LEE SILVER, REMAKING EDEN 21 (2002) (“Life-in-general can exist not only in the 
absence of consciousness, but in the absence of any kind of neurological activity whatsoever.  
Examples of life-in-general abound on earth and include millions of different species of microbes, 
fungi, and plants.”). 
 37. See id. at 24 (defining “life in a special sense” as the “very separate meaning that we give to 
conscious life, in its human form”).  McDonald’s argument and court cases use the phrase “human 
being” in the same way as biologists use the phrase “life in a special sense” to emphasize the unique 
qualities ascribed to a fully functioning adult individual.  The phrases are used interchangeably in 
this Comment for purposes of convenience and clarity. 
 38. Id. at 25. 
 39. See id. at 41–56 (discussing embryo formation and various views on the amount of respect 
a human embryo deserves); see also C.R. AUSTIN, HUMAN EMBRYOS: THE DEBATE ON ASSISTED 
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Some scholars argue that the embryo is “life-in-general,” yet others 
argue that it is “life in a special sense.”40  Part of the confusion 
contributing to the debate over the embryo’s status is the fact that the 
embryonic phase of development is immediately preceded by human 
“life-in-general,” and immediately followed by human “life in a special 
sense.” 
Before embryonic formation, one’s “life-in-general” forms inside his 
or her mother and father when the mother and father themselves are at 
the embryonic stage.41  Cells known as primordial germ cells “migrat[e] 
through the tissues of the early embryo” of one’s mother and father and 
eventually develop into egg or sperm cells.42  The egg and sperm cells 
produced by the mother and father cannot develop into a human 
individual by themselves because each only contains half of the 
necessary genetic information.43  However, scholars note that the egg and 
sperm are important phases of human development just like the 
embryo.44  But egg and sperm cells have never been generally accepted 
as “special,” given their inability to express human emotions or become 
self-aware, not to mention that further human development is speculative 
at best, given their lack of a complete genetic makeup necessary for 
development.45 
The human embryo is different from egg and sperm cells because it 
has the genetic tools for further development, yet the embryo lacks the 
ability to express emotions or self-awareness.  Upon fertilization of the 
egg by the sperm, known as conception,46 the egg and sperm combine 
their genetic information resulting in the requisite amount of genetic 
code for further development.47  Conception is a popular phase for 
                                                                                                                       
REPRODUCTION (1989), reprinted in BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS 36–39 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing the formation of the human embryo). 
 40. See SILVER, supra note 36, at 21–26 (coining the phrases “life-in-general” and “life in a 
special sense”); AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 36 (describing the competing views on the human embryo 
by showing how some scholars believe conception is the focal point for when human life becomes 
“special” while others do not). 
 41. See SILVER, supra note 36, at 41–47 (describing the events before and after conception); 
AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 36–39 (same). 
 42. AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 37. 
 43. See SILVER, supra note 36, at 42 (noting that one pair of chromosomes comes from the 
mother and the other comes from the father resulting in twenty-three pairs of chromosomes); cf. 
AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 36 (noting that fertilization is the point at which some begin to refer to 
human life as a human individual). 
 44. See, e.g., SILVER, supra note 36, at 41–43 (describing the egg and sperm); AUSTIN, supra 
note 39, at 36 (noting that the embryo is just a collection of undifferentiated cells). 
 45. See SILVER, supra note 36, at 30–40 (discussing the origins of life on earth). 
 46. NEIL A. CAMPBELL & JANE B. REECE, BIOLOGY 978 (7th ed. 2005). 
 47. See SILVER, supra note 36, at 45 (describing that fertilization is complete when the 
chromosomes from the sperm and egg commingle for the first time). 
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focusing on the beginning of one’s “life in a special sense” because for 
some it represents when one becomes an individual,48 and it is the first 
point at which all of the genetic pieces are in place.49  The result of 
conception is a zygote, which begins dividing about twenty-four hours 
after fertilization.50  The zygotic cells continue to divide to form a 
collection of cells known as the embryo. 51  The cells comprising the 
embryo are undifferentiated stem cells, meaning that they have no 
specific function, and notably, “there are no nerve cells formed during 
the first week after fertilization,”52 meaning that an embryo lacks any 
capacity to have thoughts or feelings.53  Although the embryo is different 
from earlier phases of human life based on its more realized potential for 
human development, it still lacks the qualities we ascribe to “special” 
human life absent a nervous system.54 
Because the human embryo has the requisite genetic tools for 
developing into “life in a special sense” and due to its presence at an 
early stage of human development, the modern scientific understanding 
of the human embryo has allowed for the development of unique 
technologies.  Technologies such as in vitro fertilization, embryo 
screening, cloning, and genetic manipulation take advantage of the 
embryo’s unique biology.  In vitro fertilization is an assisted 
reproductive technology that can help a woman become pregnant despite 
problems of infertility.55  Hormonal stimulation allows for the surgical 
                                                     
 48. See AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 36 (discussing various notions of when a person’s life 
begins). 
 49. Id.  But see SILVER, supra note 36, at 44–45 (describing how fertilization is not complete 
until the zygote divides for the first time because until then, there is no mingling of the genetic 
material of sperm and egg). 
 50. CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 46, at 978. 
 51. See SILVER, supra note 36, at 45–46 (discussing usage of the term “embryo”).  The embryo 
secretes hormones indicating its presence within the mother.  CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 46, at 
978.  Without secretion of a particular embryonic hormone, the mother will lose the embryo, id., and 
actually, “one-third of all pregnancies, often before the woman is even aware she is pregnant,” end 
in spontaneous abortion or miscarriage.  Id. 
 52. SILVER, supra note 36, at 52. 
 53. See id. (“[F]eelings, of any sort, cannot arise in the absence of a functional nervous system . 
. . .”). 
 54. See CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 46, at 979 (explaining the stages of embryo growth 
and development).  During formation, the embryo begins to implant itself into the endometrium for 
further development, and this is when the first trimester of pregnancy begins.  Id.  It is during the 
first trimester when the embryo begins developing body organs.  Id.  “By the end of the eighth week, 
all the major structures of the adult are present in rudimentary form,” and the embryo becomes 
known as the fetus.  Id.  The fetus grows and becomes active during the second trimester and the 
pregnancy becomes obvious.  Id.  The third trimester consists of more growth until reproductive 
mechanisms trigger the beginning of labor and the postnatal life of the child.  Id. at 981. 
 55. See id. at 984 (describing the in vitro fertilization process). 
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removal of eggs from the woman’s ovaries,56 and then the sperm 
fertilizes the egg in a culture dish where the resulting cell incubates for a 
few days and develops into an embryo.57  Once the embryo divides into 
the eight-cell stage, it is implanted in the woman’s uterus where 
development continues as in traditional pregnancies.58  In vitro 
fertilization is an assisted reproduction method, whereas embryo 
screening involves “testing” an embryo for desired characteristics.59  “At 
the eight-cell stage of [embryonic] development, one cell is removed . . . 
without causing lasting harm, for testing.”60  Embryo screening allows 
for the testing of any embryo for things such as chromosomal 
abnormalities, gender, and matches for siblings who need transplants.61  
Rather than test an embryo for its genetic information, the process of 
cloning allows for the creation of an embryo that has the exact genetic 
information as the genetic donor.62  The process involves removing an 
egg cell’s nucleus, which contains the genetic information, and replacing 
it with the nucleus of an adult cell.63  Nuclear transfer replaces the 
natural process of sperm-egg fertilization because the nucleus of an adult 
cell contains all forty-six chromosomes, therefore providing the requisite 
amount of genetic information for continued development.64  And finally, 
                                                     
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  In vitro fertilization can cost thousands of dollars, but the process has resulted in 
thousands of healthy children with very few irregularities.  Id.  Despite successes, in vitro 
fertilization is not a flawless process.  Id.  One clinic reported that 50–70% of attempts resulted in 
pregnancies and 40–66% resulted in live births in 2004.  Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago, 
http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivf%20pregnancy%20live%20birth%20rates%202004.htm (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2007). 
 59. See Rick Weiss, Increasingly, Couples Use Embryo Screening, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 
2006, at A02 (“Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD, starts with the creation of a ‘test tube’ 
embryo.  At the eight-cell stage of development, one cell is removed, apparently without causing 
lasting harm, for testing.”). 
 60. Id.  The cells remain incredibly similar to one another at the eight-cell stage, so the testing 
of one cell reveals information about all of the remaining cells.  See CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 
46, at 414 (describing that cell differentiation results in cell specialization of structure and function 
to form tissues and organs). 
 61. Weiss, supra note 59.  Once an embryo undergoes screening and is confirmed to have the 
desired characteristics, it may be implanted in a woman as described for in vitro fertilization.  
CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 46, at 984.  This allows prospective parents to choose which 
embryo is best suited for their desires.  See Weiss, supra note 59 (describing the possibilities 
provided by embryo screening).  However, twenty-one percent of clinics were aware of errors made 
during the process, “including children born with the problem that was supposed to have been 
screened out.”  Id. 
 62. See CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 46, at 416 (describing reproductive cloning). 
 63. See id. at 416–17 (noting that reproductive cloning has been successful for sheep, mice, 
cats, cows, horses, and pigs). 
 64. See id. at 219 (noting that all nonreproductive body cells “each contain 46 chromosomes 
made up of two sets of 23, one set inherited from each parent”); SILVER, supra note 36, at 51 (noting 
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genetic modification is a process resulting in an organism’s artificial 
acquisition, removal, or replacement of “one or more genes from the 
same or another species” allowing for predetermination of the 
organism’s genetic design.65  As demonstrated by these four 
technologies, the uniqueness of human life at the embryonic stage allows 
for unparalleled opportunities for the application and advancement of 
scientific theory. 
Understanding of the human embryo and technological processes 
associated with it suggest that, at a minimum, the embryo is “life-in-
general” with potential for development into “life in a special sense.”66  
One scholar has difficulty defining the embryo as “special” because the 
embryo is only one-fifth of a millimeter long, lacks consciousness, 
cellular diversity, and mobility, and is indistinguishable from its 
surroundings.67  In other words, the embryo “is in no way a ‘body’ and it 
does not bear the faintest resemblance to a human being—and the soul 
cannot enter yet, for the [embryo] may yet divide in the process of 
twinning, and the soul being unique is indivisible.”68  However, the 
Geneva Convention Code of Medical Ethics suggests that the embryo is 
“special” by acknowledging that physicians “‘will maintain the utmost 
respect for human life from the time of conception.’”69  Despite 
disagreement on whether the human embryo represents mere potential or 
                                                                                                                       
that there is no conception in the cloning process because the nucleus donated by the adult cell 
provides the requisite amount of genetic material).  The resulting egg cell can then be implanted into 
a female’s uterus for further development.  CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 46, at 416.  In 1997, 
Scottish researchers cloned a lamb named Dolly by taking cells from the mammary glands of one 
lamb and fusing them with the nucleus-free egg of another lamb.  Tests proved that the cloned lamb 
had identical chromosomes as that of the nucleus donor.  Although the chromosomes of a clone are 
identical to that of the nucleus donor, cloned animals do not necessarily look or behave identically to 
their nucleus donor.  For instance, a herd of cloned cows from the same nucleus donor consisted of 
dominant and submissive cows.  Id.  Moreover, a cloned cat had a different colored and patterned 
coat than her nucleus donor.  Id. at 416–17.  As with in vitro fertilization and embryo screening, 
reproductive cloning is not a flawless procedure.  Id.  A cloned sheep “suffered complications from a 
lung disease usually seen in much older sheep and was euthanized.”  Id. at 416.  “Cloned mice . . . 
are prone to obesity, pneumonia, liver failure, and premature death.”  Id. at 417.  In fact, cloned 
embryos are more likely than not to suffer complications in their development towards birth.  
Reproductive cloning of humans is currently speculative, but Korean researchers have already 
cloned embryos and allowed the resulting cells to divide.  The cells were not allowed to divide any 
further, but these results are a major step towards the successful cloning of a human being.  Id. 
 65. CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 46, at 407.  Salmon have been genetically modified to 
grow faster by adding a more active growth hormone gene to their DNA.  Id.  Most genetic 
modification concerns plants, but recent advances in biotechnology, such as the complete mapping 
of the human genome, and success with salmon suggest the possible genetic modification of human 
beings.  Id. at 407–08. 
 66. See AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 36–39 (discussing when a person’s life actually begins). 
 67. Id. at 38. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 36. 
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is actually “special,” some areas of the law afford the human embryo at 
least limited protection based upon its potential. 
The law affords human embryos “respect because of their potential 
for human life.”70  Recognition of limited legal rights for the human 
embryo appears in custody suits, abortion cases, and criminal and 
wrongful death actions.71  In Davis v. Davis, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee expressly acknowledged that human embryos are not 
“persons” or “property” and deserve “special respect because of their 
potential for human development.”72  In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 
of the United States noted that the government has an “important and 
legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the potentiality of human 
life.”73  And in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,74 the current legal standard 
governing the embryo’s rights in the context of abortion, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the government may regulate 
abortion so long as regulation does not place an undue burden on women 
seeking an abortion.75  The embryo’s legal protection is thin, however, 
because it is not a legally recognized “person” deserving full 
constitutional rights.76  If the embryo was a “person,” it would receive 
full constitutional protection and abortion would be murder.77  Although 
the embryo only has the right of government protection short of causing 
an undue burden for abortion, in some jurisdictions, in contexts other 
than abortion, killing an embryo is considered murder. 
Despite the extremely thin legal rights of the embryo in abortion law, 
the criminal and common law in some jurisdictions protects embryos 
when someone other than the woman carrying the embryo causes its 
death, when a pregnant woman kills in defense of the unborn child’s life, 
or when a child born alive is injured as a result of actions before birth.78  
                                                     
 70. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
 71. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 39, at 39–47 (discussing constitutional, statutory, and 
common law recognition of the beginnings of human life). 
 72. 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 73. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (analyzing when the government’s interest in 
preserving life is compelling enough to override a woman’s right to abortion). 
 74. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 75. Id. at 878; see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 39, at 41–42 (discussing Roe and legal 
rights guaranteed to the human embryo). 
 76. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–58 (concluding that the government’s interest in human life is not 
compelling at the embryo stage of development). 
 77. See id. (“If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of course, 
collapses,  for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.”). 
 78. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 39, at 41–44 (discussing the rights of the human embryo in 
the criminal law and common law); Marguerite A. Driessen, Avoiding The Melissa Rowland 
Dilemma: Why Disobeying A Doctor Should Not Be A Crime, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 1, 9–14 
(2006) (recognizing several theories concerning the source of the rights of unborn children); see also 
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At common law, the old rule was that recovery of damages was allowed 
“only if the decedent were born alive,” but “[m]any courts now 
distinguish between a viable and a pre-viable fetus for purposes of 
recovery”79 because viability is the stage at which unborn life can survive 
outside the womb.80  However, some courts have gone so far as to allow 
damages for unborn life prior to viability.81  Whether or not viability is 
the point at which the law recognizes rights of the embryo, legal 
protection of the embryo does not necessarily rest on grounds that the 
embryo is “special” and deserving of full constitutional rights.82  Instead, 
the human embryo deserves legal respect “because of its potential to 
become a person . . . [but] it should not be treated as a person[] because it 
has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established 
as developmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic 
potential.”83  In fact, one scholar notes that the legal rights of the unborn 
actually originate from the recognition of the rights of others in unborn 
children.84  Although legal respect for the human embryo is not the 
equivalent of full legal protection, the potential for human development 
                                                                                                                       
People v. Kurr, 654 N.W.2d 651, 653–54 (Mich. App. 2002) (allowing a pregnant woman to use the 
defense of “defense of another” as an excuse for a crime when the embryos’ life is endangered by a 
third party); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1990) (holding the defendant liable for 
the death of a woman’s unborn child despite the fact that the defendant did not know of the 
pregnancy). 
 79. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 39, at 44–45 (citing numerous jurisdictions).  One common 
law court rejected the old rule because “the live birth requirement was an arbitrary line that served 
no purpose of the wrongful death and . . . survival statute.”  Id. at 45.  “Today’s holding merely 
makes it clear that the recovery afforded the estate of a stillborn is no different than the recovery 
afforded the estate of a child that dies within seconds of its release from its mother’s womb.”  
Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1089 (Pa. 1985).  Some people have embraced this ruling because 
they claim “the fetus is . . . a full human being entitled to all protections accorded to all other human 
beings.”  FURROW ET AL., supra note 39, at 45.  Those opposing the new rule have “argued that there 
was no genuine loss that was being compensated in such cases, and that the real reason for 
permitting the recovery was to allow plaintiffs a greater chance at a larger recovery.”  Id. 
 80. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (noting that viability occurs at twenty-four weeks into the 
pregnancy, but may decrease in time as technology advances); AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 38 
(approximating that viability is achieved at about twenty-four weeks into pregnancy). 
 81. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 39, at 46–47 (citing numerous cases allowing for recovery 
prior to viability and numerous cases not allowing recovery prior to viability). 
 82. See People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (removing any distinction 
between viability and nonviability so that the homicide statute applied to any “unborn” entity).  The 
court in People v. Ford notes that “whatever the entity within the mother’s womb is called, . . . [i.e., 
life-in-general or life in a special sense], because of the acts of the defendant,” the entity no longer 
has a chance for development.  See id. at 1201 (focusing on the fact that some sort of life existed, 
despite whether the entity was a “human being”).  And although the use of deadly force is a valid 
defense to a charge of manslaughter, “the defense is available solely in the context of an assault 
against the mother . . . [and] has not extended the protection of the criminal laws to embryos existing 
outside a woman’s body, i.e., frozen embryos stored for future use.”  Kurr, 654 N.W.2d at 654. 
 83. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992). 
 84. Driessen, supra note 78, at 9–14 (discussing the rights of the mother and the state in unborn 
children). 
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should weigh heavily in determining whether a particular law applies to 
the human embryo. 
C. The Thirteenth Amendment 
For the Thirteenth Amendment to preclude human-embryo patents 
the Amendment must apply to human embryos and, if it applies, must 
adequately prevent the type of relationship created between the patent 
holder and human embryo.  On its face, the scope of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s application is not abundantly clear.  The Amendment is 
short and concise—”[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction.”85  The Amendment does not explicitly state to whom 
the Amendment applies or define “slavery” and “involuntary servitude.” 
1. To Whom Does the Thirteenth Amendment Apply? 
In determining to whom the Thirteenth Amendment applies, it is 
helpful to address the historical context in which the Amendment was 
enacted and Supreme Court cases discussing its scope.  Historical 
context suggests that the Framers never directly considered the effects of 
the Amendment upon prenatal life.  Supreme Court cases addressing the 
issue discuss it in the context of race rather than distinguishing between 
prenatal and postnatal life.  However, even if the Framers of the 
Thirteenth Amendment intended it to apply to the human embryo, a 
modern court would not adopt the 1865 understanding that the human 
embryo was a human being. 
The social and political concerns surrounding the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment highlight the turmoil created by the controversial 
status of African slavery at the time.86  “Slavery remained a haunting 
presence in national politics, and although often unspoken, it inspir[ed] 
many apprehensive glances over the shoulder.”87  For instance, the 
Jacksonian coalition supported slavery, but did so in a passive way in 
order to remain in good standing with their antislavery counterparts in 
the North.88  On the other hand, William Lloyd Garrison “set out to 
                                                     
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 86. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, & POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 56–63 (1981) (describing the political impact of slavery). 
 87. Id. at 56. 
 88. Id. 
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destroy slavery by direct, personal attack upon everyone associated with 
the institution and everyone who temporized with it.”89  The political 
struggle between pro- and antislavery groups resulted in “no southern 
abolition societies remain[ing] in existence, and the defense of slavery as 
a positive good . . . replac[ed] the old argument that it was an unfortunate 
but inescapable legacy.  More and more, southerners regarded every 
attack on the institution as an impeachment of their decency, virtue, and 
honor.”90  The overwhelming social and political struggle regarding 
African slavery suggests that the effects of the Thirteenth Amendment 
upon prenatal life were never fully considered. 
Although the express intent of the Framers regarding prenatal life is 
not clear based upon the politics of the time, the Supreme Court has 
implied the Framers’ intent for defining the situations for which the 
Thirteenth Amendment applies.91  Focusing on the “pervading spirit” for 
determining the range of circumstances intended by the Framers,92 the 
Court makes clear that 
in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these 
amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said 
was the pervading spirit . . . , the evil which they were designed to 
remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until 
that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional 
law can accomplish it.93 
The Slaughter-House Court says the “pervading spirit” of the 
Amendment is to prohibit all types of slavery “akin to African slavery.”94  
In other words, “while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the 
Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind 
of slavery, now or hereafter.”95 
The Supreme Court has looked to the “pervading spirit” for 
determining to whom the Thirteenth Amendment applies.  Notably, it is 
                                                     
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 57. 
 91. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 941–42 (1988) (interpreting two criminal 
statutes’ use of “involuntary servitude” by using the same interpretation used for the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 92. Id.; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) (explaining the Court’s 
approach for interpreting the Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as 
Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1368 (1992) 
(same). 
 93. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72. 
 94. Id.; Amar & Widawsky, supra note 92, at 1369 (quoting Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942). 
 95. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72. 
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the Court and not the Framers that use the phrase “human being,” and 
they do so to emphasize the Thirteenth Amendment’s impact beyond the 
African race to preclude the enslaving of members of any race.96  
Although the Slaughter-House Court explicitly states that the Thirteenth 
Amendment applies to “human beings,” it never discusses prenatal life 
nor makes a distinction between human “life-in-general” and human “life 
in a special sense.”97  The Framers and the Court have never squarely 
addressed the Amendment’s application to the human embryo, but even 
if the Framers believed that the human embryo was a human being, a 
modern court should not adopt the 1865 understanding of the human 
embryo as a human being. 
Although the actual text of the Constitution remains static over time, 
constitutional interpretation continues to develop.  McDonald’s reliance 
upon reproduction literature and abortion debates to show “that the 
framers understood ‘human being’ to include pre-natal human beings” 
fails to address whether modern courts would agree with the Framers and 
implement their understanding of “human being” into modern law.98  
Because the Framers never squarely considered prenatal life, it is unclear 
whether the Framers and the Court set a static legal definition of human 
being based upon 1865 scientific theory.  Instead, the legal definition 
should develop along with the scientific definition.  Fourteenth 
Amendment Supreme Court cases concerning equal protection and 
abortion suggest that a court would adopt a modern understanding of 
scientific theory. 
For example, the Supreme Court reevaluated and changed its 
interpretation of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
response to changes in the education system.99  Prior to Brown v. Board 
of Education,100 the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection clause to require separate facilities for 
African-American and white citizens.101  The reasoning was that equality 
                                                     
 96. See id. at 69 (inferring that the Thirteenth Amendment “can only apply to human beings”).  
“The word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood in this 
country, and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.”  Id. 
 97. Id.  Another Supreme Court case using the phrase “human being” in the context of the 
Thirteenth Amendment also fails to acknowledge prenatal life.  See Hodges v. United States, 203 
U.S. 1, 26 (1906) (referring to human beings of African descent). 
 98. McDonald, supra note 17, at 1370–81. 
 99. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 483 (1954) (reinterpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (interpreting “separate but equal” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee to only require separate facilities of 
equal quality for each race). 
GROSSMAN FINAL.DOC 6/25/2007  10:45:52 AM 
746 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
could be achieved despite segregation of the races.102  Although the facts 
indicated that there was equality between the black and white schools 
regarding physical and educational needs, the Court held that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”103  The Court explicitly 
acknowledged that “[i]n approaching this problem, [it] cannot turn the 
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 
when Plessy v. Ferguson was decided.  [It] must consider public 
education in the light of its full development and its present place in 
American life throughout the Nation.”104 
Similar reasoning was used by the Supreme Court for declining to 
define human life as becoming “special” at the moment of conception.  
The Court rejected the idea that human beings are formed upon 
conception and instead adopted a modern understanding of human 
development by refraining from defining exactly when human life 
becomes “special.”105  The Court reasoned that it was not more inclined 
to define “life” than science, theology, or philosophy, which all fail to 
adopt a unified, modern definition.106  Recognizing the difficulty in 
determining when human life becomes “special,” the Court expressly 
acknowledged that formation of a human being is a process and not an 
event.107  The Court highlighted that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life.”108  The drastic change in scientific 
understanding since 1865 suggests, at a minimum, that laws will not 
apply to human embryos based on the theory that the human embryo is 
“life in a special sense.” 
                                                     
 102. See id. at 550–52 (denying that desegregation was necessary for the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee). 
 103. Brown, 387 U.S. at 495.  The Court addressed the validity of “separate but equal” in public 
schools under a law denying black children enrollment in a white school.  Id. at 486. 
 104. Id. at 492–93.  In 1868, private groups were responsible for the education of white children, 
whereas the education of black children was practically nonexistent.  Id.  However, at the time of 
Brown, education had become “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment . . . .  [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of an education.”  Id. at 493. 
 105. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160–62 (rejecting any view that human life becomes 
“special” at fertilization). 
 106. Id. at 159. 
 107. Id. at 133, 160–61. 
 108. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860–73 (1992) (describing advances in 
health care and the concept of fetus viability). 
GROSSMAN FINAL.DOC 6/25/2007  10:45:52 AM 
2007] HUMAN EMBRYOS 747 
2. What Did the Thirteenth Amendment End? 
Courts, Framers, and scholars have repeatedly referred to African 
slaves as property, and it is clear that the Thirteenth Amendment ended 
the institution of African slavery.  But a closer look at the slaveholder-
slave relationship reveals a complexity beyond mere property 
ownership.109  At least one slave state, Tennessee, expressly 
acknowledged the slave as “thinking property” and recognized agency 
aspects of slavery.110  And on the federal level, the Supreme Court of the 
United States implied an agency relationship through its interpretation of 
“involuntary servitude.”111 
a. The Supreme Court of Tennessee: Agency Aspects of the 
Slaveholder-Slave Relationship 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee was confronted with several 
situations “revealing the juristic limitations of treating a slave as ordinary 
chattel.”112  The slave’s humanity as “thinking property” actually 
“conferred particular value on slave property . . . because where a 
‘property in intellectual and moral and social qualities, in skill, in 
fidelity, and in gratitude,’ was concerned, the ‘market value’ was not 
‘adequate remedy.’”113  Troublesome areas of the law for treating slaves 
as ordinary property were the laws of manumission, “vicarious liability 
of slaveholders for wrongs committed by slaves,”114 and “liability for 
conversion of a slave’s services and death of a slave.”115 
The laws of manumission “demonstrate[d] . . . that the Tennessee 
Court was generous and sympathetic, sensitive to the humanity of the 
slave,” in addition to revealing the plight of treating humans as legal 
                                                     
 109. See Jacob I. Corré, Thinking Property at Memphis: An Application of Watson, in SLAVERY 
& THE LAW 437, 437–38 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997) (describing the special value of slaves versus 
chattel or other property); Arthur Howington, “A Property of Special and Peculiar Value”: The 
Tennessee Supreme Court and the Law of Manumission, 44 TENN. HIST. Q. 302, 302 (1985), 
reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND SLAVERY 210, 210 
(Paul Finkelman ed., 1989) (same). 
 110. Corré, supra note 109, at 437. 
 111. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988). 
 112. See Corré, supra note 109, at 438 (discussing cases where property law was inadequate for 
addressing the slaveholder-slave relationship). 
 113. Howington, supra note 109, at 302, reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, 
THE CONSTITUTION, AND SLAVERY 210, 210 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989). 
 114. See Corré, supra note 109, at 439–44 (discussing trouble faced by Tennessee regarding 
slaves and vicarious liability). 
 115. See id. at 444–47 (discussing trouble faced by Tennessee regarding conversion of a slave’s 
services and death of a slave). 
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property.116  Manumission was the emancipation of a slave, which could 
take effect immediately or upon the occurrence of a later event.117  In 
order to recognize emancipation, the court had to acknowledge the 
slave’s right to freedom, which “was meaningless unless he or she could 
protect it.”118  However, here exists “‘one of the most troublesome 
questions’ in the law of emancipation, ‘whether children born of a female 
slave who had been promised freedom were entitled to the same 
benefit.’”119  Concluding that “emancipation should be ‘liberally 
construed in favor of liberty,’” the court held that although emancipation 
takes effect at a later date, the soon-to-be-free slave has a “‘present right 
to freedom,’” and “[a] child born to such a person was born free.”120  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied a child born to 
such a person his freedom when the child was sold into Alabama and 
escaped back to Tennessee.121  The court admitted that the child was 
“free-born” but upheld the Alabama slaveholder’s interest based on 
fugitive slave laws.122  Despite the outcome of this case, the laws of 
manumission definitely highlight the legal system’s trouble with treating 
the slave as ordinary property. 
The peculiar situation of the slave as “thinking property” pressed the 
courts to consider agency law for resolving certain disputes. 
A vision of the owner-slave relationship grounded on principles of 
agency had the virtue of implying a realistic account of the slave’s 
mental capacities, but it could not accommodate the slave’s lack of 
legal rights.  A model of the relationship based on notions of property . 
. . made sense of the slave’s personal status in legal terms, but it could 
not be coherently adopted in cases where the slave had exercised his  
 
                                                     
 116. Howington, supra note 109, at 307, reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, 
THE CONSTITUTION, AND SLAVERY 210, 215 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989). 
 117. See id. at 303–07, reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND SLAVERY 210, 211–15 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989) (discussing laws of 
manumission). 
 118. Id. at 307, reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
SLAVERY 210, 215 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989). 
 119. Id. at 306, reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
SLAVERY 210, 214 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989). 
 120. Id., reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
SLAVERY 210, 214 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989) (quoting Harris v. Clarissa, 14 Tenn. 164–65 (1834)). 
 121. Id. at 307, reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
SLAVERY 210, 215 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989) (citing Sidney v. White, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 91 
(1853)). 
 122. Id. 
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rational capacities in a manner that seemed significant from a moral or 
juristic point of view.123 
In Wright v. Weatherly,124 Wright’s slave killed Weatherly’s slave and 
Weatherly sued Wright to recover the value of his slave.125  The Supreme 
Court of Tennessee did not find Wright liable, but it is unclear on which 
legal theory the court based its opinion.126  To apply a property theory, 
the court would have to analogize the circumstances of this case to the 
property law governing domestic animals.127  Therefore, Wright would 
only be liable if he knew of his slave’s propensity for violence.128  
Conversely, liability would not exist under an agency theory if the slave 
committed the act willfully and without Wright’s approval.129  Wright 
was not liable under either theory because he did not know of any violent 
propensity of his slave and the slave acted willfully without Wright’s 
consent, although the court did not explain which theory it based its 
opinion.130  After Wright, “the Tennessee Supreme Court inclin[ed] 
toward an agency-based conception of the relationship between 
slaveholder and slave” and rejected a pure-property analogy.131 
An analogy between slavery and agency also materialized in Jones v. 
Allen,132 a case involving the conversion of a slave’s services.133  Allen’s 
slave performed cornhusking work for another slaveholder, Jones, 
without the express permission of Allen, yet Jones had the impression 
that Allen had given implied permission.134  After performing the work 
and before returning home, Allen’s slave was killed by an uninvited 
guest.135  Allen sued Jones for conversion and the death of his slave.136  
Jones’s counsel argued a pure agency theory for absolving Jones of any 
liability based upon the custom of implied permission of another 
                                                     
 123. See Corré, supra note 109, at 438. 
 124. 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 367 (1835). 
 125. Corré, supra note 109, at 439. 
 126. Id. at 440–41. 
 127. Id. at 439–40 (quoting Wright, 15 Tenn. at 378–80). 
 128. Id. at 439 (quoting Wright, 15 Tenn. at 378–80). 
 129. Id. at 440 (quoting Wright, 15 Tenn. at 378–80). 
 130. Id. at 440. 
 131. See id. at 443 (citing various cases). 
 132. 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 626 (1858). 
 133. Corré, supra note 109, at 444. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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slaveholder for his slave’s cornhusking services.137  However, the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee “avoided passing on the broadest 
implications of the pure agency theory put forth by Jones’ counsel,” and 
instead found Jones not liable “by reading the law of . . . conversion 
extremely narrowly.”138  Although neither the vicarious liability nor the 
conversion cases resulted in the court’s full embrace of agency law for 
governing these situations, the Supreme Court of Tennessee was forced 
away from pure property law and closer to that of agency for resolving 
disputes involving “thinking property.”139  Although the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee is only one court among many that adjudicated cases 
involving slaves, its struggle in applying pure property law to slaves 
suggests that the Thirteenth Amendment ended something more complex 
than mere property ownership of man. 
b. A Prohibition Against Compelled Agency Relationships 
The Supreme Court of the United States implies an agency 
relationship between slaveholder and slave based on its interpretation of 
“involuntary servitude.”140  The Amendment has been interpreted to 
prevent “‘those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which 
in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results.’”141  
The Amendment ends both slavery and involuntary servitude, which 
have two different meanings.142  The word slavery is associated with “all 
shades and conditions of African slavery.”143  And involuntary servitude, 
at a minimum, prevents 
servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the 
use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or 
threat of coercion through law or the legal process.  This definition 
encompasses those cases in which the defendant holds the victim in 
servitude by placing the victim in fear of such physical restraint or 
injury or legal coercion.144 
                                                     
 137. Id. at 446. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 447–48. 
 140. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (recognizing the difficulty in 
defining the range of circumstances in which the Thirteenth Amendment applies). 
 141. Id. (citing Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)). 
 142. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 90 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 69. 
 144. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952 (emphasis added). 
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A court may also consider other forms of coercion, poor working 
conditions, and the victim’s vulnerabilities in determining whether 
servitude was involuntary.145  Essentially, the Thirteenth Amendment 
“guarantees freedom from arbitrary domination” and ensures the 
individual’s complete autonomy.146 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s scope extends beyond slavery and 
involuntary servitude via the Enabling Clause, which allows Congress to 
enact laws “‘rationally’ capable of classification as a ‘badge’ or 
‘incident’ of slavery.”147  Scholars have specifically argued that cloning 
forms a badge of slavery by creating a form of “genetic bondage,” thus 
infringing the autonomy of children born as a result of cloning.148  
Essentially, the argument relies upon genetic determinism, or the idea 
that “‘our fate is in our genes,’” to show the potentially harmful 
psychological effects resulting from expectations created by knowing 
one’s genetic make-up.149  “If raised by the clone-parent, a clone-child 
could see what he or she has the potential to become” and “[h]aving 
insight into one’s potential may cause enormous pressures to live up to 
expectations . . . , even more so than those generally experienced by 
children.”150  Clones, therefore, would not be as autonomous as 
nonclones because they would feel bound by expectation and restricted 
in making their own life decisions.151  Arguably, this creates a badge of 
slavery by infringing on “those fundamental rights which appertain to the 
essence of citizenship.” 152  But as Elizabeth Foley concludes, “it is 
                                                     
 145. Id. 
 146. ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 112 
(2004). 
 147. See Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 647, 667 (2000) (citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. as the seminal case on the badges of 
slavery). 
 148. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone?  Constitutional Challenges to Bans on 
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 652–56, 668 (1998) (suggesting that the potential 
psychological and social harms associated with knowing one’s genetic predispositions violates the 
Thirteenth Amendment); cf. Foley, supra note 147, at 666–70 (challenging the notion that cloning 
violates the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against “badges of slavery”). 
 149. See Andrews, supra note 148, at 652–56 (quoting Watson, one of the scientists responsible 
for discovering DNA). 
 150. AM. MED. ASS’N, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 5 (1998), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/report98.pdf. 
 151. See id. (“A sports star’s clone-child unable to live up to these expectations could be dubbed 
a failure unable to capitalize on his or her genetic gift . . . .  If a clone-child saw that he or she was 
likely to develop certain diseases or had failed at certain tasks, his or her undertakings might be 
bounded by what the clone-parent had done.”); Andrews, supra note 148, at 654 (“We already limit 
parents’ genetic foreknowledge of their children because we believe it will improperly influence 
their rearing practices.”). 
 152. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (“All citizens 
of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white 
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unlikely that a law banning human cloning could be construed as an 
attempt by Congress to remove a stamp of inferiority based upon race” 
because clones would not constitute their own race.153  Aside from 
whether cloning constitutes a badge of slavery, the potential 
psychological implications of reproductive cloning, and for that matter, 
any genetic technology involving genetic knowledge, such as embryo 
screening and genetic manipulation, are important considerations for 
determining whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of 
“involuntary servitude” applies in such circumstances. 
Although the Amendment is a prohibition against infringing 
another’s autonomy, the potential psychological effects of reproductive 
cloning do not violate the Court’s interpretation of “involuntary 
servitude” because the Court has limited the ways in which one can be 
liable for violating another’s autonomy, not to mention that a prohibition 
against mere psychological effects ignores the coercion and agency 
aspects previously considered by the Court.154  For example, the Court 
expressly rejected an argument that the Thirteenth Amendment prevents 
psychological coercion because inclusion of psychological coercion 
within the breadth of involuntary servitude would require courts to 
“depend entirely upon the victim’s state of mind . . . .  [S]uch a view . . . 
would provide almost no objective indication of the conduct or condition 
. . . prohibit[ed], and thus would fail to provide fair notice to ordinary 
people who are required to conform.”155  Sure, one could argue that the 
act of cloning itself would provide an objective indication of the conduct 
or condition prohibited, however, reproductive cloning would not 
necessarily be the cause of unwanted psychological effects in every 
situation.  Instead, children may experience negative psychological 
effects from environmental factors independent of cloning, such as poor 
parenting.  And again, any potential negative psychological effects of 
reproductive cloning would be a result rather than a means for coercing 
labor. 
In addition to rejecting psychological coercion, the Court rejects an 
argument that the Thirteenth Amendment precludes situations where 
slave-like conditions are actually achieved no matter the means for 
                                                                                                                       
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”); 
Foley, supra note 147, at 667–68 (discussing the definition of “badges of slavery”). 
 153. Foley, supra note 147, at 668 (refuting the argument that cloning violates any badge of 
slavery as contemplated by the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 154. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988) (holding that psychological 
coercion, alone, does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 155. Id. 
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achievement.156  The Court reasons that there are no objective criteria for 
determining slave-like conditions beyond physical and legal coercion.157  
Because the Supreme Court interpreted “involuntary servitude” as ending 
compulsory labor achieved through means of physical or legal coercion, 
the potential psychological effects of cloning do not trigger Thirteenth 
Amendment protection.158  And although the Court never explicitly 
addressed an agency relationship between slaveholder and slave, its 
definition of “involuntary servitude” implies an agency relationship by 
preventing a compelled agency relationship.  Cases heard by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
demonstrate that the Thirteenth Amendment ended something more than 
property ownership of man by implicitly and explicitly relying on agency 
analogies for resolving disputes. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Thirteenth Amendment does not preclude human-embryo 
patents because it does not apply to human embryos, and it ended 
something wholly different than the relationship between patent holder 
and invention.  There are two major flaws with McDonald’s argument 
claiming that human-embryo patents violate the Thirteenth Amendment.  
First, McDonald’s argument illogically assumes that the Framers 
intended to include the human embryo and fails to consider how modern 
courts would address the issue.  Second, McDonald’s argument claims 
that the Thirteenth Amendment ended mere property ownership of 
human beings without considering the true nature of the slaveholder-
slave relationship.  Because a human-embryo patent gives the patent 
holder a property interest in a human being, human-embryo patents 
would violate her pure property interpretation of the Amendment. 
Contrary to McDonald’s argument, the Thirteenth Amendment does 
not apply to human embryos because slavery only indirectly affected the 
unborn, and today the legal recognition of the embryo rests on respect for 
its developmental potential, which the spirit of the Thirteenth 
Amendment fails to capture.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of “involuntary servitude” uses language that is 
inapplicable to the embryo, such as “coercion” and “labor.”  However, 
even if the Amendment applies to human embryos, the Thirteenth 
                                                     
 156. Id. at 951. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. at 942 (basing its interpretation on the “pervading spirit” of the Amendment’s 
purpose of ending all slavery “akin to African slavery”). 
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Amendment prohibits relationships reminiscent of the slaveholder-slave 
relationship rather than human-embryo patents.  Additionally, there are 
several practical and policy reasons for why the Thirteenth Amendment 
should not prohibit human-embryo patents. 
A. The Thirteenth Amendment Does Not Protect the Human Embryo 
from Patents 
1. Slavery’s Indirect Influence on Human Embryos 
The Thirteenth Amendment was not expressly intended to apply to 
human embryos.  The Framers and courts have never expressly included 
the human embryo within the scope of the Amendment, and given the 
controversial status of the human embryo, it seems counterintuitive to 
conclude that any law applies to human embryos based upon 
implications of nonconsideration.  Perhaps the Framers and courts failed 
to consider the effects of the Amendment on the human embryo because 
of slavery’s indirect application to unborn life.  The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee’s cases involving manumission demonstrate that the unborn 
children of slaves were not considered slaves independent of their 
mothers in at least one slave state.  If unborn children were slaves, then 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee would not have classified the unborn 
child based upon the status of its soon-to-be-free mother.  Instead, a 
slaveholder would have been required to make a separate act of freedom 
for the child in addition to freeing the mother.  Because the Tennessee 
court did not require a separate act of emancipation to account for the 
unborn child’s freedom, slavery may have only indirectly affected the 
unborn by virtue of the mother being enslaved, which would explain the 
Framers’ nonconsideration of the issue. 
In fact, slavery indirectly included the unborn children of slaves by 
virtue of the fact that the mother was a slave.  Upon ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, a mother could no longer be a slave and, 
therefore, neither could any unborn child.  If a mother was not a slave, 
then the Thirteenth Amendment was not necessary to end the 
enslavement of unborn children because there is no way an unborn child 
could become a slave.  Although, in the context of manumission, the 
Tennessee court denied a man his freedom despite the fact that he was 
born to a soon-to-be-free woman. 
The Supreme Court of the United States denied a grown slave, 
Sydney, his freedom despite his mother being promised her freedom 
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before his actual birth.159  The Court recognized that Sydney was “free-
born” but still denied his freedom at the time of trial.  Rather than 
denying his freedom because he was a slave before birth, Sydney lost the 
case in favor of a slaveholder who had purchased Sydney.  The case may 
have turned out differently if Sydney had never been sold because the 
Court would not have had the competing interest of a third-party 
purchaser.  A legal theory rendering void the purchase of a free man by a 
slaveholder who was unaware of the man’s freedom would have placed a 
heavy burden on slave trade by requiring slaveholders to investigate each 
purchase, which the Court was unwilling to do.  Instead of implying that 
unborn children were slaves, the Court’s holding signifies a willingness 
to protect the fugitive slave laws and rights of a purchasing slaveholder 
at the expense of the rights of free blacks.  Nonetheless, slavery’s 
indirect effects upon unborn life and the lack of express inclusion of 
embryos suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to 
apply to human embryos at the time of ratification. 
2. The Spirit of the Laws Encourage Human-Embryo Patents 
Current legal recognition of the human embryo suggests that human-
embryo patents would be welcomed by the law rather than thwarted by 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  Today, the prevailing understanding of the 
human embryo is that it represents potential for human development 
rather than “life in a special sense,” and the law does not afford the 
embryo protection except in circumstances where the development 
potential of the embryo is implicated or threatened.  As recognized by 
the scientific community, the human embryo cannot be equated with a 
fully functioning human being absent any indicia of a nervous system.  
The law has responded to scientific understanding by failing to classify 
the embryo as a constitutional “person” and instead recognizes and 
respects the embryo only for its potential. 
The “pervading spirit” of the Thirteenth Amendment does not reflect 
the same concern for embryonic potential as do other laws that currently 
recognize the embryo.  Legal recognition of the embryo in custody 
disputes, abortion law, criminal law, and common law arise out of 
circumstances straddling the life and death of the embryo and 
preservation of potential.  Bear in mind, African slavery involved 
arbitrary subordination of individuals and communities, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment safeguards persons from the evils associated with 
                                                     
 159. See supra Part II.C.2.a (discussing the laws of manumission as applied to unborn children). 
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arbitrary domination.  Essentially, the Thirteenth Amendment 
encompasses a much broader goal than current legal recognition of the 
embryo—that of preserving individual autonomy during life.  The 
preservation of individual autonomy does not reflect the law’s concern 
for preserving the potential of embryos because autonomy and physical 
development are not synonymous.  Just because one lacks autonomous 
freedom does not mean that their potential for physical development is 
threatened, and just because one’s physical development is threatened 
does not mean their autonomy goes unpreserved.  For instance, civil and 
criminal laws, such as torts and murder, preserve the physical potential, 
or realization of potential, for human life, but these laws are not 
sufficient to guarantee autonomous freedom—hence the need for the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  Yet the Thirteenth Amendment is not sufficient 
for protecting physical potential, or realization of potential—hence the 
need for the criminal laws and torts.  Although the government has a 
substantial interest in preserving potential for human development, as of 
now the embryo does not have protection from the law beyond direct 
preservation of life and potential because the embryo is not a 
constitutional “person” with full legal rights.  Therefore, the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of autonomy during life does not match the type 
of protection currently afforded in other areas of law and should not 
apply to human embryos. 
In fact, human-embryo patents would help guard and promote 
embryonic potential.  Notably, the existence of a patent does nothing to 
diminish the embryo’s potential—the act of obtaining and actually 
owning a patent does not physically affect embryos.  Instead, human-
embryo patents would help guard and promote embryonic potential 
rather than threaten embryonic potential, as contemplated in other areas 
of the law.  Because the spirit of patent law is to promote 
commercialization and innovation, a patent would promote embryonic 
potential by encouraging inventors to invest in embryonic technologies.  
With a patent, the patent holder would exploit their limited monopoly by 
investing in new techniques that are safer and more efficient than 
existing technologies.  In addition to encouraging technological 
advances, a human-embryo patent would create a form of private 
regulation regarding patented embryonic technology.  Because only the 
patent holder would be able to license and practice the invention in the 
absence of governmental prohibition, anyone else practicing the 
invention would have to seek approval from the patent holder.160  
                                                     
 160. See infra Part III.D (discussing specific practical reasons why human-embryo patents 
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Although the subject matter of the patent, such as a process for embryo 
manipulation, may have consequences that affect the embryo’s potential, 
these consequences exist whether or not the inventor obtains a patent, 
because in the absence of a patent, people will still practice the 
technology.  When compared to the spirit of legal recognition of the 
human embryo in general, human-embryo patents should be encouraged 
as a means for promoting technological advancement and private 
regulation. 
B. Interpretation of “Involuntary Servitude” Does Not Account for 
Embryos 
Essentially, the Supreme Court interprets “involuntary servitude” as 
a prohibition against infringement of an individual’s autonomy resulting 
in compulsory labor through means of physical or legal coercion.  As 
previously discussed,161 the potential psychological effects on children 
born as a result of reproductive embryonic technologies do not violate 
the Thirteenth Amendment because they are not a means for compelling 
labor.  And even if they were, psychological coercion is excluded from 
the definition of “involuntary servitude.”  Additionally, there are 
concerns regarding the physical abnormalities of children born as a result 
of embryonic technologies.162  However, similar to psychological 
concerns, the physical harms are not caused for the purpose of 
compelling labor, and they may be avoidable with the advancement of 
technology.  The analysis of the Court’s interpretation, however, is not 
complete without discussing whether it applies to life at the embryonic 
stage.  Application of the Thirteenth Amendment has never involved 
unborn life, and therefore interpretation of the Amendment has resulted 
in the use of language, such as “coercion” and “labor,” that is difficult to 
apply to the human embryo. 
1. Physical and Legal Coercion of Embryonic Life 
Legal and physical coercion of life at the embryonic stage differs 
drastically from any possible coercion of “life in a special sense” simply 
because of their different stages in the timeline of human development.  
Broadly defined, coercion means the use of “force or intimidation to 
                                                                                                                       
should not be prohibited). 
 161. See supra Part II.C.2.b (discussing the Court’s interpretation of “involuntary servitude”). 
 162. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 150, at 3; Andrews, supra note 148, at 652. 
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obtain compliance.”163  First, a postnatal human being has some sort of 
capacity for understanding legal threats and sanctions, whereas an 
embryo has no means for detecting such actions.  Issuance of a patent 
could constitute legal coercion of the embryo, but there is no rational 
way of concluding whether the legal imposition of a patent is 
“involuntary” given the absence of cognitive ability in the embryo for 
recognizing such legal action.  One could argue that some postnatal 
human beings, such as incompetent or less competent persons, cannot 
understand a legal threat.  Therefore, the ability to understand a legal 
threat cannot provide the basis for distinguishing between the human 
embryo and “life in a special sense,” because surely incompetent or less 
competent postnatal humans can be considered enslaved.  However, this 
argument fails to account for the varying degrees of understanding of 
“life in a special sense” and the complete inability of an embryo to 
understand because it lacks nerve cells and a nervous system.  In 
contrast, human life beyond the embryonic stage has a nervous system 
and therefore, has at least some capacity for understanding.  Even still, it 
seems difficult to conceptualize the legal coercion of a fetus, or even a 
newborn, as being similar to the coercion used by slaveholders given the 
relatively low level of rational thought at these early developmental 
stages. 
Second, physical coercion of an adult human being involves pain and 
suffering, whereas any possible physical coercion of an embryo could 
not possibly involve pain and suffering absent a nervous system.  In fact, 
it is quite difficult to equate the physical coercion associated with 
slavery, such as physical abuse, with any physical actions associated with 
an embryo, such as in vitro fertilization, embryo screening, cloning, and 
genetic manipulation.  Physical coercion of postnatal human beings 
denotes unwanted physical contact; however, physical coercion of an 
embryo may not always be undesirable.  For instance, in vitro 
fertilization allows for embryos to develop into postnatal human beings 
that otherwise would not exist due to infertility problems; embryo 
screening allows parents to choose which embryo has the best chance for 
survival and development; and genetic manipulation could possibly 
prevent diseases and illnesses that are otherwise untreatable.  None of 
these technologies inherently involves the type of physical coercion 
imposed upon slaves and addressed by the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Therefore, it is a big leap to assume that “coercion,” as used in the 
                                                     
 163. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/coercion (last visited Mar. 29, 
2007). 
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Court’s interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment to postnatal human 
beings, is inclusive of any possible coercion of a human embryo. 
2. Embryonic Labor and Autonomy 
The type of labor associated with slavery and contemplated by the 
Court differs from the type of labor an embryo performs.  Sure, an 
embryo does labor in the form of physical “work” as understood for 
physical processes,164 and a patent holder stands to gain financially from 
the result of this work just as a slaveholder gained from slave labor.  But 
the type of physical movement associated with an embryo is different 
from the manual labor performed by a slave.  Slave labor was an active 
endeavor where a slave made the conscious decision, although compelled 
and against his will, to perform the labor.  Compelling slave labor was a 
two-step process involving the actions of the slaveholder coercing the 
slave to work followed by the slave’s conscious submission to the 
coercion.  On the contrary, labor performed by an embryo is passive, 
meaning that the embryo does not make a conscious decision to perform 
work, but instead reacts to its environment.  A patent holder can compel 
the embryo to react in certain ways by altering the chemical 
environment, but even absent compulsion, an embryo will perform its 
work nonetheless.  Therefore, the work of the embryo cannot be 
compelled despite the fact that an inventor can dictate the results of the 
work.  The Court’s use of the word labor implies the strong presumption 
that the type of compulsory labor the Thirteenth Amendment ended is of 
a kind inapplicable to the human embryo. 
The Court’s interpretation of “involuntary servitude” implicates the 
autonomy of the slave, which is different from that of a human embryo.  
Autonomy generally means independence, self-governance, and freedom 
from arbitrary exercise of authority over one’s will, which is implicated 
by the Court’s acknowledgement that any labor prohibited by the 
Thirteenth Amendment must be compelled.165  Philosophers have 
grappled with the definition of autonomy and free will as applied to the 
cognitive abilities of the human species, yet the human embryo lacks any 
cognitive capacity.  This begs the question: What is the autonomy of the 
embryo?  Any autonomy ascribed to the embryo would exist by virtue of 
its ability to react naturally to its environment without unnatural 
                                                     
 164. See DAVID HALLIDAY ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS 118 (6th ed. 2001) (defining 
work as “energy transferred to or from an object by means of a force acting on the object”). 
 165. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/autonomy (last visited Mar. 29, 
2007). 
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interference.  One could argue that any direct infringement on the 
embryo’s natural development infringes upon its autonomy. 166  This 
interpretation, however, differs significantly from the autonomy of 
human “life in a special sense,” which is presented with choices and 
makes rational decisions based upon past experiences and future 
consequences.  An embryo does not “make decisions” or “have 
experiences” in the same way as a postnatal human being, and so 
reference to the embryo as having autonomy does not account for the 
embryo’s lack of rational thought.  Any autonomy of an embryo is 
distinguishable from that of human “life in a special sense” because the 
embryo is not capable of rational thought.  Words such as autonomy, 
coercion, and labor, as used in the context of slavery, are inapplicable to 
human life at the embryonic stage, and therefore the Supreme Court’s 
definition of the range of circumstances triggering the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “involuntary servitude” is inapplicable 
to the human embryo. 
C. A Comparative Analysis of the Property Rights Associated with 
Slavery and Patents 
Regardless of whether or not the Thirteenth Amendment applies to 
human embryos, the Amendment does not preclude human-embryo 
patents because the Amendment ended the unique relationship between 
slaveholder and slave rather than mere property ownership of man.  
McDonald’s argument claims that the Thirteenth Amendment ended all 
property ownership in human beings by reducing the slaveholder-slave 
relationship to mere property ownership, and thus equating the complex 
relationship between slaveholder and slave to the property interest of a 
patent.  However, the Supreme Court has held that the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibits situations “akin to African slavery,” and there are 
two sharp distinctions between the slaveholder-slave relationship and 
human-embryo patents that put the two on unequal footing: (1) the 
slaveholder-slave relationship was a hybrid of property and agency, 
whereas a patent involves pure property; and (2) the right of a 
slaveholder was an affirmative right, whereas a patent bestows upon its 
holder a negative right.  Although McDonald argues that the Thirteenth 
Amendment ended all property ownership of human beings, 
                                                     
 166. See SILVER, supra note 36, at 50 (“If the word natural is used to mean the most likely 
outcome nature will take in the absence of any external interference . . . , then the natural destiny for 
the human embryo is death” because seventy-five percent of all naturally fertilized eggs die before 
birth.). 
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acknowledging the fundamental differences between slavery and patents 
makes it a challenging comparison. 
1. Property-Agency Hybrid vs. Pure Property 
Despite common references to slavery as man owning man as 
property, at least one slave state’s highest court, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee, explicitly relied upon agency law for determining outcomes 
of disputes between slaveholders.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of 
the United States implicated the agency aspect of slavery through its 
interpretation of the phrase “involuntary servitude.”  In contrast, a patent 
involves pure property law and does not necessitate nor invoke agency-
law analogies.  A patent holder merely has the right to exclude others and 
has no right to interact with the subject matter of the patent, especially in 
any way reminiscent of agency.  This drastically differs from the 
property-agency hybrid of slavery suggested by state and federal courts. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee’s struggle in classifying slaves 
purely as property and the need for agency analogies for resolving 
disputes between slaveholders suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment 
ended something other than man owning man as property.  Although 
scholars and historians have classified slaves as property, this 
classification seems to be more out of convenience than accuracy 
because it ignores the inescapability of agency analogies arising from the 
unusual value of slaves as “thinking property.”  Bolstering the analogy 
between slavery and agency is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“involuntary servitude,” which prohibits the legal and physical coercion 
of compulsory labor.  This interpretation essentially ended working 
relationships based upon force and duress where the employee has no 
choice but to work, which bears little relation to property law.  Although 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee never fully adopted agency law as the 
governing law for slavery and the Supreme Court of the United States 
has never explicitly addressed the agency-aspect of slavery, the 
slaveholder-slave relationship could never be reduced to mere property 
ownership given the unique value of the slave as “thinking property.” 
Subordination of “thinking property” in the context of African 
slavery in the United States was arbitrary and inhumane; but human-
embryo patents are neither.  African enslavement was arbitrary because it 
was based upon subjective notions of racial superiority between 
members of the same species.  Slavery was inhumane because it involved 
merciless treatment of members of the human species for the purpose of 
imposing upon their will.  Patented technologies involving human 
embryos, however, do not involve subordination, arbitrariness, or 
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inhumanities similar to those involving slavery.  First of all, 
subordination implies something of a lesser or inferior value, and 
patenting a human embryo is not a result of it being lesser or inferior.  
Rather, it revolves around commercialization and innovation, of which 
the embryo just so happens to be a part.  Remember, a slave was 
“thinking property,” but the human embryo cannot be so characterized 
because it lacks a nervous system, preventing any possible brain 
function.  Accordingly, the means for subordinating “thinking property” 
is different in nature than subordination of an embryo.  Moreover, the use 
of human embryos is not arbitrary—the use derives from the unique 
position of the embryo in the timeline of human development.  The 
embryo has the requisite genetic properties for human development, yet 
the early stage of development at which the embryo exists allows for 
unique opportunities for scientific technology.  Although some disagree 
over whether human-embryo technologies are humane, it is not 
universally agreed that the burdens of human-embryo technologies 
outweigh the benefits.  But today it is generally agreed that any benefit of 
slavery is outweighed by its inhumanities.  The complexity of the 
property-agency relationship between slaveholder and slave derives from 
the slave being “thinking property” and distinguishes the slaveholder-
slave relationship from human-embryo patents.  Absent agency-type 
analogies for nonthinking property, human-embryo patents cannot create 
a relationship “akin to African slavery.”   
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2. Affirmative Right vs. Negative Right167 
 
The differences arising from the affirmative-negative distinction 
between slavery and patents exhibit why the Thirteenth Amendment 
should not be assumed to prohibit all property ownership of man, but 
rather should only outlaw relationships that are comparable to that of 
slaveholder and slave.  The affirmative nature of the slaveholder-slave 
relationship drastically differs from the negative property rights 
associated with a patent in terms of the rights conferred, duration of the 
relationship, physical control over the subject matter, and assertion of 
right upon infringement.  The Thirteenth Amendment specifically ended 
the affirmative right of a slaveholder to control his slaves and has never 
been held to end any negative property right, such as the rights 
associated with a patent.  The affirmative right of a slaveholder is 
apparent from the property-agency nature of the slaveholder-slave 
relationship where the slaveholder had the right to direct the slave for his 
own benefit.  However, a patent holder’s negative property right only 
allows her to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented 
invention and does not give any affirmative right to practice the 
                                                     
 167. Property interests can be affirmative or negative but not both.  See Tibor R. Machan, The 
Perils of Positive Rights, THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY, Apr. 2001, at 49, 49, available at 
http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=2993 (discussing the inherent conflict 
between “positive” and “negative” rights).  An affirmative property interest entitles the property 
holder to “goods or services at the expense of other persons” whereas a negative property interest 
prevents “uninvited interventions of others.”  Id.  The property interest associated with a patent is 
negative because it allows the patent holder to exclude others from making, using, or selling their 
invention.  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 126 (describing why a patent property interest is a 
negative interest).  Alternatively, the property interest associated with slavery was affirmative 
because it allowed the slaveholder to reap the benefits of the slaves’ services to the detriment of the 
slaves.  See Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619–1865: A 
Case Study of Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 93, 94 (1985), 
reprinted in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND SLAVERY 31, 32 
(Paul Finkelman ed., 1989) (noting that “Africans who had been enslaved and who survived the 
tragic transatlantic slave passage were sold to buyers who bargained for the exclusive right to ‘reap 
the fruits’ of the slaves’ labor, which the owners enforced by exercising their right to ‘uncontrolled 
authority’ over the slave” (emphasis added)). 
The affirmative interest of a slaveholder, however, cannot be reduced to mere property 
ownership because the Supreme Court of Tennessee made analogies between slavery and the laws of 
agency.  See Corré, supra note 109, at 439–47 (confirming the court’s rejection of pure property law 
analysis for cases involving the vicarious liability of a slaveholder for his slave’s actions and the 
conversion of a slave’s services).  The Supreme Court of the United States never considered a pure 
property approach for interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment and instead holds that the amendment 
prohibits situations “akin to African slavery,” ultimately implying an agency relationship by 
interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit compulsory labor.  See United States v. 
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (recognizing that the Thirteenth Amendment ended African 
slavery and circumstances reminiscent of African slavery); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) 
(stating that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended “to cover those forms of compulsory labor 
akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results”). 
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invention or interact with the patented subject matter.  Any right to 
practice the invention is by virtue of governmental acquiescence, or lack 
of governmental prohibition, and the absence of other patents on the 
same subject matter.  For instance, a world without patents would allow 
anyone and everyone to practice invention X.  Now, in a world with 
patents, only the patent holder can practice patented invention X because 
only she has the right to exclude the rest of the world from making, 
using, or selling the invention.  However, if the government prohibits the 
practice of invention X, the patent holder still has the negative property 
right of exclusion but cannot take any affirmative action to practice the 
invention.  Although the Thirteenth Amendment is commonly referred to 
as ending property ownership of man, it has only been applied to 
preclude the affirmative right to control others and not the negative right 
to exclude. 
 McDonald’s argument incorrectly states that: 
 The right to manufacture would give the patent holder the right to 
reproduce, or clone, the human being and to exclude others from 
cloning that human being.  . . . 
 The right to use would give the patent holder the right to control the 
human being’s activities and to prevent others from interacting with the 
human being.  . . . 
 The right to sell would give the patent holder the right to contract 
out, or sell, the human being and his services.168 
 
Although her argument initially acknowledges that a patent right is a 
negative interest, the example is misleading because it incorrectly 
implies that the patent holder has an affirmative right to manufacture, 
use, and sell the invention.  Despite this misapplication, McDonald’s 
argument raises the point that the patent holder might assert even a 
negative property right in an adverse way.  For example, it could be used 
to prevent others from making, using, or selling the patented invention in 
situations where the patented technology is essential for preserving an 
embryo’s potential.  In such situations, the law would have to allow for 
an exception, similar to the medical-use exception, which excuses 
liability for certain patent-infringing actions.169  Otherwise, an embryo’s 
developmental potential could be threatened, which would be contrary to 
the spirit of the laws recognizing the importance of embryonic life.  Still, 
                                                     
 168. McDonald, supra note 17, at 1385. 
 169. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000) (allowing medical practitioners to infringe certain types of 
patents without affording the patent holder any legal remedy against the medical practitioner). 
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based upon the context in which the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, 
the distinction between affirmative and negative rights is important for 
determining what the Amendment ended. 
The distinction between affirmative and negative rights is also 
important for determining against whom the patent holder is able to 
assert his or her right upon a finding of infringement.  In the context of 
slavery, a slaveholder’s right could be infringed either when the slave 
disobeyed authority, such as by running away or refusing to work, or by 
third parties, such as conversion of services.  In situations of third party 
infringement, either the laws of property or agency would determine the 
outcome of a dispute.  But in situations of disobedience of the slave, a 
slaveholder would assert his right directly by punishing, selling, or 
finding ways to make the slave work.  On the other hand, a human-
embryo patent holder would never assert her negative property right 
against the embryo because the embryo is the subject matter from which 
others are being excluded and there is no affirmative right to the embryo 
itself, thus making it impossible for any action of the embryo to infringe 
a right of the patent holder.  Essentially, the vulnerable party in the 
slaveholder-slave relationship is shielded from actions of infringement 
by the Thirteenth Amendment because the Amendment took away the 
slaveholder’s legal right over the slave.  Yet the vulnerable party in the 
human-embryo patent relationship—the human embryo—needs no 
shielding from actions of infringement because the subject matter of a 
patent cannot infringe its own patent.  Therefore, one of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s benefits in the context of slavery, shielding vulnerable 
victims from infringement actions, does not exist in the context of 
human-embryo patents. 
Finally, the negative property right associated with a patent avoids 
two harms associated with slavery—seemingly unlimited duration of 
control and direct physical control.  The negative property right of a 
patent gives the patent holder a monopoly for practicing the invention by 
virtue of the patent holder’s right to exclude others.  But the patent 
system attempts to maximize the fairness of the monopoly by limiting 
the effectiveness of the patent to a term of twenty years.170  The 
implication of patent expiration is that the patent holder’s right to 
exclude disappears and the patented subject matter enters the public 
domain for everyone to make, use, or sell.  Alternatively, the relationship 
between slaveholder and slave did not have a readily identifiable ending 
                                                     
 170. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 126 (noting that the patent term for utility patents is 
twenty years from the filing date). 
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date, meaning that the slave was under the direct physical control of the 
slaveholder indefinitely.  Direct physical control may have existed in the 
slaveholder-slave relationship, but with the commercialization of a 
patented invention comes the transfer of physical control of the 
commercialized item.  In the context of a human-embryo invention, the 
patent holder would most likely license a process incorporating the 
human embryo or sell actual embryos to third parties.  Although the 
patent holder has physical control over the subject matter for a period of 
time, the inevitable commercialization of the patented subject matter 
involves third parties who also have physical control over the invention.  
Despite the lack of physical control, the patent holder still maintains its 
right to exclude others.  The ability of a patent holder to maintain its 
negative property interest in the patented invention without having direct 
physical control over the subject matter differs from a slaveholder’s 
direct control over his slaves.  The affirmative-negative distinction 
between the slaveholder-slave relationship and human-embryo patents 
demonstrates that the two are distinct from one another and present 
separate issues.  Given that the Thirteenth Amendment is limited to 
prohibiting conditions “akin to African slavery,” human-embryo patents 
should not be prohibited by the Amendment because they are not 
comparable to the slaveholder-slave relationship. 
D. Other Considerations for Concluding that the Thirteenth Amendment 
Should Not Prohibit Human-Embryo Patents 
The Thirteenth Amendment is not the proper tool for policing the use 
of human-embryo technologies because it ignores the constitutional 
origins of the patent system, prohibits all patenting of human-embryo 
technologies rather than determining the good from the bad, and 
excludes the use of patents as a form of private regulation.  Comments by 
the USPTO and McDonald are minimally persuasive legal authority for 
determining whether the Thirteenth Amendment precludes human-
embryo patents because these comments are not valid law, and in fact, 
valid law allows for the patenting of human-embryo inventions based on 
the Court’s declaration that patentable subject matter includes anything 
man-made.  Nonetheless, the USPTO denies that patentable subject 
matter includes human life altered by man. 
The patent system and the Thirteenth Amendment originate in the 
Constitution and, despite their apparent conflict, they can be reconciled 
with one another.  Notably, the constitutional grant creating a patent 
system carries greater weight than the Thirteenth Amendment because it 
appears in the original Constitution rather than as an Amendment.  
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However, at the time of ratification of either the Constitution or 
Thirteenth Amendment, human-embryo patents could hardly have been 
anticipated.  Human-embryo patents, therefore, present unanticipated 
issues resulting in an unforeseen potential conflict between constitutional 
laws.  Constitutional conflict is not unique to human-embryo patents and 
the Thirteenth Amendment as displayed by the conflict between 
copyright laws and the First Amendment.  Copyright law allows the 
holder of a copyright the exclusive rights, among several others, of 
copying and distributing the copyrighted material.171  This implicates the 
guarantee of free speech attributed to the First Amendment because those 
other than the copyright holder infringe the copyright holder’s rights 
when expressing the copyrighted material without permission.172  Despite 
the tension between copyright law and freedom of speech, the two have 
compromised and found ways to coexist without one completely 
trumping the other.  The tension and compromise affecting copyright law 
and freedom of speech serve as a good analogy for human-embryo 
patents and the Thirteenth Amendment.  The legal system should not feel 
pressure to choose a “winner” between the patent system and Thirteenth 
Amendment because it would be a shame for one to usurp the importance 
of the other. 
The patent system and the Thirteenth Amendment serve distinct but 
important functions in the legal system and United States culture.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment ended the institution of slavery in the United 
States and is a reminder of the evils associated with slavery that we seek 
to avoid.  Alternatively, the patent system serves as a reward for 
innovation and an inducement for commercialization of new 
technologies.  Essentially, one is a correction of past mistakes and the 
other is encouragement for a better future.  The apparent conflict 
between the two encourages consideration of the consequences 
concerning preemption of one by the other.  Failure to consider the 
Thirteenth Amendment in the context of human-embryo patents would 
result in overlooking the uniqueness we attribute to the entire human 
species, as supported by the promotion of equality of all shapes, sizes, 
colors, and phases of human life.  This is not to say that the remedy of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, for the purpose of ending arbitrary 
enslavement, is the same remedy necessary for preserving the respect of 
the human embryo.  Preemption of human-embryo patents by the 
Thirteenth Amendment would preempt all human-embryo patents, thus 
                                                     
 171. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 172. MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 506–07, 552–53. 
GROSSMAN FINAL.DOC 6/25/2007  10:45:52 AM 
768 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
discouraging innovation in an area where there are positive and negative 
implications unique to the field of embryonic technology.  Instead of a 
complete prohibition of human-embryo patents, the law should seek to 
regulate the use of human-embryo technologies and separate the good 
from the bad.  In fact, patents actually serve as a form of private 
regulation that could help preserve respect for the human embryo and 
associated technologies. 
The patent holder’s right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling a patented technology is exclusive and serves the function of 
private regulation.  Private regulation is achieved through the patent 
holder’s policing the patented technology to prevent unauthorized 
practice of the patented invention.  Absent a patent and subsequent 
policing of the patent, nothing other than the possibility of governmental 
prohibition stands in the way of others wishing to practice the invention.  
Patents serve to limit who practices the invention by granting the patent 
holder the legal authority to exclude others.  This means that a patent 
holder can decide who can and cannot practice the invention, which 
could possibly prevent the irresponsible practice of a technology by those 
unqualified to do so.  Because patents serve as a form of private 
regulation, those who dislike human-embryo technologies should 
actually celebrate the patenting of human-embryo technologies to 
prevent irresponsible practices in the absence of government regulation 
or prohibition.  In fact, private regulation may actually serve as a 
stronger form of regulation than governmental regulation because 
typically those practicing in a specific field know the activities of their 
peers and may be more aware of irresponsible practices than the 
government.  Opponents to human-embryo patents may be confusing 
promotion of innovation and commercialization with the amount of 
actual practice of an invention.  If patents are not allowed for human-
embryo technologies, inventors are still going to practice these 
technologies.  However, absent a patent, the inducement to 
commercialize is severely lessened because there is no limited monopoly 
for recovering the cost of investing in the technology.  Therefore, patents 
do not necessarily promote the actual practice of an invention, but 
instead, promote commercialization and private regulation.  Such 
considerations should not be ignored when determining the legality of 
human-embryo inventions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Thirteenth Amendment is not the correct means for prohibiting 
the patenting of human-embryo inventions and the legal system should 
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look elsewhere for regulation of such technologies.  The Amendment 
does not apply to unborn life because it was not intended to apply at the 
time of ratification and a modern court would not interpret the 
Amendment to apply to human embryos today.  However, even if the 
human embryo was within its scope, human-embryo patents do not 
violate the Thirteenth Amendment because they do not create a 
relationship sufficiently similar to that of slaveholder and slave.  At the 
time of ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, human-embryo patents 
were unimaginable, and therefore lawmakers did not consider the effect 
of laws upon patenting human life.  Now that technologies exist that 
incorporate the human embryo, the law should take a fresh look at the 
issues presented by such technologies rather than rely on precedent that 
fails to even consider their possibility.  Rather than prevent all embryonic 
technologies with the broad swipe of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
scientific and legal communities should consider the actual issues posed 
by human-embryo patents and seek instead to regulate their use. 
 
